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Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 70 (September 18, 2008)1
CRIMINAL LAW – SELF INCRIMINATION
Summary
Donald Mitchell appeals his second-degree murder conviction. Mitchell argues that the
district court trial contained five procedural errors, the most significant being a violation of his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed. The Nevada Supreme Court finds the district court did not abuse its discretion
in any of the five instances in which Mitchell alleged wrongdoing. Concerning the Fifth
Amendment issue, this opinion finds the district court properly ordered Mitchell to undergo a
state-requested psychiatric evaluation because Mitchell had presented his own psychiatric
evaluation evidencing post-traumatic stress disorder.
Factual and Procedural History
The Eighth Judicial District Court found that Donald Mitchell fatally shot Edward
Charles at a swimming-pool party on July 24, 2005. The men, who had a history of violent
confrontations, had another argument that ended with Mitchell repeatedly shooting Charles.
Before his trial, Mitchell sought out a psychiatric evaluation from Dr. Thomas Bittker and
Dr. Louis Mortillaro. The doctors concluded that Mitchell suffered from post-traumatic stress
disorder, hypervigilence, and paranoia.
Mitchell pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder with a deadly weapon, stating his
mental condition made him unable to form the requisite mens rea and caused him to act in selfdefense. He waived his right to a jury, and the case proceeded to a bench trial.
The district court, granting a motion by the State, then ordered Mitchell to undergo
another psychiatric evaluation by an independent doctor. Dr. David Schmidt evaluated Mitchell
for two days and concluded that Mitchell was trying to appear excessively pathological. The
State failed to give Mitchell background information on the doctor’s qualifications and planned
testimony.
At the trial, the State asked Mitchell in cross-examination about an incident in which
Mitchell prank called 911 about a terrorist attack. The State asked Dr. Bittker and Dr. Mortillaro
in cross-examination about an incident in which Mitchell, as an elementary-school student,
threatened another student with a knife.
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On appeal, Mitchell raises the five procedural errors. First, he argues the court violated
his right against self-incrimination by forcing him to submit to Dr. Schmidt’s psychiatric
evaluation and then took Dr. Schmidt’s testimony. Mitchell’s also argues that the state did not
present sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction, the court should not have allowed the State
to inquire about Mitchell’s prior bad acts, the court should have kept Dr. Schmidt from testifying
because the State did not fully disclose witness information, and the court should not have let the
State question Dr. Schmidt.
Discussion
A compelled psychiatric evaluation did not violate the right against self incrimination
The right against self-incrimination derives from the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments.
The right bars a government from compelling a defendant to incriminate himself and from
introducing those compelled statements at trial. However, an exception noted in Estes v. State2
allows prosecutors to obtain their own psychiatric evaluation of a defendant when that defendant
raises an insanity defense. The evaluation must speak to the defense, not the defendant’s
culpability for the charged offense.
Nevada had never before extended this exception beyond the insanity defense, so this
opinion evaluated case law in state courts for battered-spouse cases3 and in federal circuit courts
for insanity4 cases. Defendants in the battered-spouse cases, like Mitchell, presented their mental
conditions as an explanation for why they acted in self-defense. This court relied on the
following principles derived from battered-spouse casses: (1) courts have inherent authority to
seek truth and promote orderliness,5 (2) a compelled psychiatric exam is proper when a
defendant brings his own mental condition to issue,6 and (3) an unfair symmetry arises if the
state cannot use its own psychiatric evaluation to rebut the defendant’s.7 The insanity cases
enumerated similar reasoning: (1) A defendant must submit to a psychiatric exam if he
introduces his mental condition as an issue,8 (2) the court must be fair to the state9 and (3) a
psychiatric exam is the best way for the state to examine the defendant’s mental issues.10
The Court repeated that Mitchell himself raised the mental state as a defense. It
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Mitchell to undergo an
independent psychiatric evaluation.
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The State presented sufficient evidence
Under Nevada law, there is a violation of due process when no rational fact finder – using
evidence construed most favorably to the prosecution – can determine beyond a reasonable doubt
that a defendant committed a crime.11 For Mitchell’s second-degree murder charge, the State had
to prove malice aforethought and use of a deadly weapon.12
The Court concluded that the State presented sufficient evidence for both propositions.
The prosecution illustrated malice aforethought using Mitchell’s violent history with Charles,
Mitchell’s announcement that he would get a gun and witness accounts about the shooting. Use
of a deadly weapon was proved sufficiently by witness accounts, police evidence and Charles’
fatal gunshot wound.
The district court appropriately allowed questioning into prior bad acts
If a defendant does not object to questioning at trial, the Nevada Supreme Court reviews
that questioning to determine if it affected the defendant’s substantial rights meaning the
questioning prejudiced the defendant.13 Because Mitchell did not object at trial to questioning on
his prior bad acts, this opinion searched for evidence of “plain error.”
Questioning on the 911 call was proper
Nevada sometimes allows prosecutors to raise evidence of a defendant’s actions separate
from the charged crime. If a defendant submits evidence of his good character, the State may
submit evidence of his bad character14 and then inquire about specific incidents.15
This opinion found that the district court committed no “plain error” in allowing the State
to question Mitchell about a prank 911 call. Mitchell twice had described himself as truthful, so
the prosecution merely responded to Mitchell’s own statements about his good character.
Questioning on the school-age threat was proper
If a defendant supports a defense by introducing a psychiatric evaluation of himself, the
State may use that evaluation for rebuttal.16 The defendant’s un-Mirandized communication with
a doctor would not be protected in that situation.
Therefore, the Court found no plain error occurred when the State asked Dr. Bittker and
Dr. Mortillaro about a threat Mitchell made in elementary school. The court based its decision on
three facts: Mitchell voluntarily requested the doctors’ report; the State cross-examined the
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doctors only about information in their files, not about separate conversations with Mitchell; and
Mitchell introduced the evaluations as part of his self-defense argument.
Omissions from pretrial disclosures do not indicate abuse of discretion
When a defendant does not object at trial to an omission from pretrial disclosures, the
Nevada Supreme Court reviews the situation for plain error so that a defendant must prove the
omission violated his substantial rights.17 Mitchell did not object at trial to missing pretrial
disclosures.
The Court concluded that the missing disclosures were not withheld in bad faith and
therefore the omission did not violate Mitchell’s substantial rights.
The district court appropriately allowed questioning of Dr. Schmidt
The Court restated that the State may rebut a defendant’s use of a medical report by
using, in a limited manner, un-Mirandized statements used in the report.18 The rebuttal must
consist only of statements that refer to the defendant’s mental state, not his culpability for a
crime.19 The court stated that such testimony would be reviewed for plain error when it did not
elicit an objection during the trial.
This court found no plain error in the district court allowing Dr. Schmidt’s testimony. The
doctor limited his testimony to Mitchell’s mental condition, including that Mitchell malingered
during his examination. Even though Dr. Schmidt briefly mentioned the shooting, that comment
did not violate Mitchell’s constitutional rights because (1) it was made in response to Mitchell’s
counsel and (2) no jury was present at Mitchell’s trial.
Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court extends an exception to the constitutional right against selfincrimination. The court may order a defendant to undergo an independent psychiatric evaluation
and allow the State to use that evaluation in trial when a defendant himself argues that posttraumatic stress disorder caused him to act in self defense.
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